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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of religion on a broad set of development 
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. We regroup these outcomes into three 
broad categories, namely, development process outcomes (growth, 
investment, conflict, and government quality), institutional outcomes 
(property rights and the rule of law) and social development outcomes 
(social and gender protection). Using two new measures of religion – 
religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) and religious polarization 
(RELPOL), alongside the traditional measure of religious diversity, our 
results suggest that broadly speaking, religion or religious diversity has no 
statistically significant impact on the institutional and social aspects of 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. However, our findings do suggest that 
religion has important effects on the development process through its effects 
on investment. The analysis suggests that African policy-makers need to pay 
attention to the changing religious dynamics and increasing religious 
polarization of African societies. 
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1 Introduction 
Since Adam Smith, the impact of religion on the socio-economic and political 
development of nations has received considerable attention in the economic 
development literature. In his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”1, Smith outlined the 
important role of religion in public life (notably, as a complement in the exercise of 
public authority and in reducing information asymetries) while in his famous book “An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, Smith raised the 
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 For an exhaustive account of Smith’s arguments see Anderson (1988). 
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problem of religious diversity. He argued that religious diversity increases religious 
competition which in turn improves the quality of supply of religious goods
2
.  
Several contemporary authors have dwelled on different aspects of the religion – 
development nexus. For instance, Tavares & Wacziarg (2001) consider the 
relationship between religion and democracy
3
; Lewer & Vand den Berg (2007) and 
Helble (2007) focus on religion and trade; Sacerdote & Glaeser (2008) focus on 
religion and education; Barro & McCleary (2003), Allesina et al (2003), Barro (1997), 
Sala-I-Martin (1997), Montalvoa & Reynal-Querol (2003) consider religion and 
growth (or development); while  Iannaccone (1998) and McCleary & Barro (2006) 
investigate religion and other behaviors.   
It is now widely accepted that the spread of religion could be a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it could facilitate economic development through the concomitant 
process of evangelism, religious liberty, mass education, mass printing, and support to 
civil society organizations, which in turn contribute to the entrenchment of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law. On the other hand, religious intransigience or 
polarization could undermine development by sidelining the importance of secular 
(western) education
4
 and also by promoting a culture of violence and terrorism.    
Over the past two centuries, Sub-Saharan Africa’s (henceforth, SSA) religious 
landscape has undergone profound changes from a monolithic African traditional 
religious
5
 society to an incereasingly polarized religious society. In 1900, 75 percent of 
Africans professed their faith in African traditional religions, whilst the Christian and 
Muslim populations put together constituted less than a quarter of the total population, 
according to historical estimates from the World Religion Database. However, by 
2010, this trend has significantly reversed in favor of the Christian and Muslim 
populations which now occupy about 86 percent of the total SSA population implying 
that less than 15 percent of Africans continue to profess their faith in African 
traditional religions
6
. There are notable differences even within the non-traditional 
African religious group. The Christian population seemed to have witnessed the most 
                                                          
2
 Recent authors, notably, Barro & McCleary (2003) have expounded on this axiom. 
3
 Woodberry (2012) focuses on one aspect of religion – missionary protestant christianism - to argue that 
religion helps entrench stable democracies around the world, by promoting mass education, mass printing, 
newspapers and voluntary organizations. Similar contributions have been made by Nunn (2010) and Anderson 
(2004). 
4
 The Boko Haram islamic religious sect in northern Nigeria is known to publicly advocate against western 
education. 
5
 African traditional religions are the  diverse sets of traditional belief systems rooted in the anscetral traditions 
and cultures of African people. Its origins could be traced far back into pre-colonial Africa. 
6
 In spite of the observed dramatic  decline in the share of African traditional religions, the influence of the 
latter on the Christian and Muslim religions can not be discounted completely, as some African Christians, 
especially those in indigenous African Christian Churches continue to mix their native African religious 
conceptions and ideologies with Christianity. In this sense, it could be argued that the observed dramatic 
decline in African traditional religions is over-stated.  
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dramatic growth since 1950, from a share of the population of about 25 percent to 
nearly 60 percent in 2010, see Figure 1 below. In international comparative 
perspective, SSA is now home to about one-in-five of all the Christians in the world 
(21 percent) and more than one-in-seven of the world's Muslims (15 percent), World 
Religion Database.  
In the light of this historical evidence, two important questions merit the consideration 
of scholars. First, the likely impact that these changing religious dynamics could have 
on SSA development trajectory and second, how the increasing religious polarization 
of African societies is expected to impact on development outcomes. Our study aims at 
answering both of these questions
7
.  
Figure 1: Evolution of the Sub-Saharan African Religious Landscape 
 
Two important contributions to the literature are to be derived from this study. First, 
the originality of our study derives from the use of two new explanatory variables, not 
used before by previous researchers, to proxy for religion: religious fractionalization 
(or diversity) and religious polarization. Second, unlike previous studies that have 
focussed mainly on an aspect of development (either democracy, trade, education or 
growth), our study intends to be more broader and comprehensive in the dimensions of 
development considered. Furthermore, by limiting the scope of the study to SSA, we 
abstract from the problem of heterogeneity which plagues previous studies.  
                                                          
7
 To keep the analysis simple, we would in this paper ignore the likely influence of the worldwide growing 
heterogeneity within the Christian religious family, which was traditionally composed mainly of Catholics and 
Protestants but is now widely dispersed into Catholics, Protestants, Pentecostals, Charismatics and Momons. 
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The results of this study can be briefly summarized as follows: 1/ broadly speaking, 
religion or religious diversity has no statistically significant impact on the institutional 
and social aspects of development in SSA. However, our findings do suggest that 
religion has important effects on the development process through its effects on 
investment. In particular, our parameter estimates suggest that both religious 
polarization (RELPOL) and religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) have 
economically and statistically significant effects on investment in SSA, although their 
effects are opposite in nature: while religious fractionalization significantly reduces 
investment, religious polarization potentially increases investment. 2/ at a 
disaggregated level, our empirical study does not suggest the superiority of any one 
single religion, although Christian faiths tend to show positive (but statistically 
insignificant) association with development outcomes. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data while section 3 presents and 
discusses the statistical results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 Data  
Our dependent variable is development and we consider both the socio-economic and 
institutional dimensions of development. The economic dimensions of development 
are captured by economic growth (proxied by the natural logarithm of real per capita 
GDP); investment (proxied by the investment share in real GDP); and the quality of 
government (proxied by the share of government expenditure in real GDP). Data for 
these variables are obtained from the  Penn World Table 6.2. The social dimensions of 
development are captured by an index of social protection (obtained from the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation) which is a multi-dimensional index capturing several aspects of 
social development.  
We capture the institutional dimensions of development by including measures for 
property rights obtained from the Heritage Foundation, measures of the rule of law 
obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2009) and measures of conflicts. 
In line with the tradition in the literature, notably, Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012), we 
proxy conflict by the number of years a country witnessed armed conflicts (data 
obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) and the number of 
revolutions (data obtained from Banks (2001) dataset).  
Our main explanatory variable is religion and like the dependent variable, there exist 
several dimensions of religion. The tradition in the literature, (see notably, Barro 
(1997), Sala-I-Martin (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), Tavares & Wacziarg (2001), 
Helble (2007) and Kodila-Tedika (2012)) is to consider the relative share of 
membership of each religious grouping in the total population as proxy for both 
religion and religious diversity. We follow the tradition by utilising the proportion of 
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population ascribing to a particular religion as indicator of religious diversity and we 
utilize the dataset used in La Porta et al. (1999). 
Worth while mentioning that some new proxies of religious diversity have been used 
in recent studies. Alesina et al. (2002) have proposed a new measure of religious 
fractionalization which they utilized in their study and found that religious 
fractionalization affects the quality of government but not necessarily long term 
growth. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002b) and Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol (2003)  have also proposed new measures for polarization (POL) and 
religious diversity and suggest that religious polarization might well capture the extent 
of religious conflict better than religious diversity: “The index POL ranges from 0 to 1. 
Opposite to what happens with the  fragmentation index, polarization reaches a 
maximum when there are two religious groups of equal size. In this type of index, what 
matters is not only how many groups there are but also if they view other groups as a 
potential threat for their interests. For a given number of groups, the threat is higher 
the larger the size of another group relative to the size of the reference group. 
Therefore the polarization index can reflect potential religious conflict in a society 
better than the fragmentation index.” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2003: 202-203).  
It is worth noting that the index of religious diversity proposed by Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol (2003) is very strongly correlated (at coefficient 0.83) with that 
proposed by Alesina et al. (2002). Montalvo & Reynal-Querol  (2003) argue that their 
index of polarization is more suited in measuring the impact of religious diversity on 
economic growth. Small wonder its appeal to several recent studies notably, 
Montalvoa & Reynal-Querol (2003), Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2003, 2005a, 
2005b). We employ these new measures of religious diversity and polarization in our 
robustness checks. 
We also use a number of control variables, which some other studies have used as 
explanatory variables. This is especially true in the case of the trade variable (captured 
by the average share of exports and imports in real GDP). We also control for the 
fertility rate (natural logarithm of number of children per woman obtained from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators 2010 on-line version), government 
effectiveness (obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators (2009)), human 
capital (proxied by primary and secondary enrollment rates courtesy World Bank's 
World Development Indicators, 2010 on-line version) and inflation (using the 
consumer price index provided by the IMF).  
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3 Empirical Results 
Development process 
In this section, we discuss the comparative empirical performance of indices of 
religious fractionalization and polarization on different dimensions of development. 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effect of different dimensions of religious 
diversity on economic development and to compare the empirical performance of 
fractionalization indices relative to polarization.  The estimation procedure for the 
direct channel (growth equation) and the indirect  channels (investment, government 
consumption share in GDP and conflict) is the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator (SURE) commonly used in recent empirical growth studies. There is at least 
one issue that could potentially affect the estimation of the standard deviation of the 
parameters. 
Our specification in Table 1 follows that in Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005b). Table 
1 shows the comparative effects of religious polarization (RELPOL) and religious 
fractionalization (RELFRAC) on growth (per capita GDP), investment, the probability 
of civil wars (conflict) and government quality (GOV). In the growth regression, we 
include the following control variables in column 1 gross school enrollment rates, 
government expenditure, investment, number of revolutions, trade, inflation, rule of 
law, and fertility rates. While in the investment regression, we control for conflict, 
human capital, government expenditure, and inflation. In the conflict regression, we 
control for rule of law and fertility rates. In the quality of government regression, we 
control for rule of law and conflict.  
The results in column 1 of Table 1 show that neither religious polarization (RELPOL) 
nor religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) has a statistically significant direct effect 
on growth, conflict, the quality of government. The finding of an insignificant effect of 
religious fractionalization on growth is thus consistent with Alesina et al. (2003). 
However, our findings suggest that both RELPOL and RELFRAC have economically 
and statistically significant effects on investment in SSA, although their effects are 
opposite in nature: while religious fractionalization significantly reduces investment, 
religious polarization potentially increases investment. The observation of a positive 
association between religious polarization and investment can be interpreted along the 
lines of Adam Smith’s logic of religious competition driving the supply of religious 
goods, while the negative association of religious fractionalization with investment can 
be interpreted along the lines of Easterly & Levine’s (1997) logic of ethnic diversity 
reducing the supply of public goods. It is worth noting that the finding of a positive 
association between religious polarization and investment is in contradiction to the 
findings by Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005b) who find investment to decrease with 
religious polarization. 
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Table 1. Religion and Development  
Seemingly unrelated regression OLS 
Per capita GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RELFRAC -1.48    
(1.30) 
-.13    
(.39) 
  
RELPOL .87    
(.92) 
 -.14 
(.27) 
 
Catholics    .00 
(.00) 
Muslims    -.00 
(.00) 
Protestants    -.00 
(.01) 
Obs 40 41 40 47 
Parms 12 11 11 8 
RMSE .38 .41 .39 .51 
R-sq 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.76 
Investment 
RELFRAC -27.67***   
(9.59) 
-1.93    
(3.29) 
  
RELPOL 18.74***  
(6.88) 
 -.14    
(2.37) 
 
Catholics    .06 
(.05) 
Muslims    -.01 
(.03) 
Protestants    .027 
(.06) 
Obs 40 41 40 47 
Parms 8 7 3 6 
RMSE 3.24 3.61 3.56 5.31 
R-sq 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.19 
Conflict 
RELFRAC 1.30    
(5.93) 
1.14   
(1.99) 
  
RELPOL -.19    
(4.14) 
 .68    
(1.43) 
 
Catholics    .01    
(.02) 
Muslims    -.00    
(.02) 
Protestants    -.02    
(.03) 
Obs 40 41 40 47 
Parms 4 3 3 5 
RMSE 2.25 2.23 2.24 2.27 
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R-sq 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.25 
GOV 
RELFRAC 34.24    
(29.99) 
-3.66    
(10.27) 
  
RELPOL -28.79   
(20.93) 
 -6.37    
(7.34) 
 
Catholics    .15    
(.13) 
Muslims    .04 
(.09) 
Protestants    -.07 
(.20) 
Obs 40 41 40 47 
Parms 4 3 3 5 
RMSE 11.40 11.54 11.59 12.61 
R-sq 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.13 
 
All regressions include a constant term.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p=10%; ** p=5%; *** p=1% 
 
As Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005b) have indicated, the results of column 1 are 
likely to be biased owing to the very high degree of correlation between religious 
fractionalization and religious polarization (see Figure 1 below). In effect, the 
coefficient of pearson of the two variables is 95.1.  
Figure. 1 Correlation between RELPOL and RELFRA 
 
To minimize the problem of multicollinearity, and following Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol (2005b), we proceed to introducing religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) and 
religious polarization (RELPOL) one at a time, in columns (2) and (3) respectively. 
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We maintain the same estimation technique and other control variables as in column 
(1). 
We observe that RELFRAC maintains its previous sign in most of the regressions 
(excepting the government quality regression where its sign changes) and also looses 
its statistical significance in the investment regression. RELPOL also ceases to be 
statistically insignificant in the investment regression and changes sign in almost all 
the regressions suggesting the high sensitivity of these results to different controls.  
In column (4) we use a different estimation strategy (OLS) and the traditional measure 
of religious diversity (that is the proportion of population ascribing to a particular 
religion). We only maintain in column (4) estimation those control variables that were 
found statistically significant in column (1). In the growth regression, these include, 
the fertility rate, trade, investment, government expenditure and conflict. In the 
investment regression, these include, government expenditure and human capital. In 
the conflict regression, these include, the fertility rate, and rule of law. In the 
government quality regression, these include conflict and rule of law.   
We find that the two main Christian religious groups (catholicism and protestantism) 
are positively correlated with investment, while the muslim faith is negatively 
correlated with investment. Grier (2007) also finds protestantism to have a positive 
association with investment. Given the lack of statistical significance of most of the 
variables in column (4), we spare the reader of any discussion of these results but 
worth mentioning that, contrary to Kuran (1997), the hypothesis of the muslim religion 
negatively affecting dvelopment cannot be completely ruled out in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Institutions 
The empirical evidence on the religion – institutions nexus is inconclusive. On the one 
hand, there are those who claim that institutions are endogenous to religion, see 
notably, McCleary & Barro (2006) while there are those who claim it is exogenous, 
see notably, La Porta et al. (1999), Levine (2005, Ayyagari Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (2006). Recently, Berggren & Bjørnskov (2012) used a measure of 
religiosity in a cross-section of 112 countries to find a negative association between 
religion and institutional outcome variables. For consistency with the literature, we use 
similar institutional variables as in Berggren & Bjørnskov (2012).  
We employ ordinary least squares estimation in the results presented in Table 2. To 
correct for likely heteroskedasticity, we present white-corrected standard errors. In 
spite of the great disparity in number of observations across models, the results of our 
cross-section analysis remain largely valid.  
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In Table 2 we estimate the effects of RELFRAC and RELPOL on the following two 
institutional aspects of development – property rights and rule of law. In both 
regressions (property rights and rule of law) we make use of the following four control 
variables namely, government expenditure, trade, real per capita GDP (in natural logs), 
and human capital (secondary enrollment rates).  
None of the variables religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) nor religious 
polarization (RELPOL) has a statistically significant effect on both property rights and 
the rule of law, when both are estimated together in column (1) or when each is 
estimated independently of the other in columns (2) and (3). Even after employing the 
standard measure of religion in column (4), religion does not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on either dimension of institutions considered. 
Table 2. Religion and Institutions 
Property Rights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RELFRAC 44.73    
(30.38)      
 -1.07     
(9.88)     
 
RELPOL -35.82     
(22.82)     
-6.916   
 (7.62)    
  
Catholics    -.01  
 (.12)     
Muslims    .01    
(.10)      
Protestants    .00    
(.16)      
Obs 39 39 40 45 
R-sq 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.37 
Rule of Law 
RELFRAC 1.20    
(1.49)      
.11    
(.50)      
  
RELPOL -.82    
(1.03)     
 -.05    
(.37)     
 
Catholics    -.00    
(.00)     
Muslims    -.00    
(.00)     
Protestants    -.00    
(.01)     
Obs 40 41 41 47 
R-sq 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.45 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
correction. All regressions include a constant term.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Legend: * p=10%; ** p=5%; *** p=1% 
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Social Indicators of Development 
We also use ordinary least squares estimation for the results presented in Table 3. As 
before, we correct for likely heteroskedasticity by presenting white-corrected standard 
errors.  
Table 3 aims to estimate the effects of RELFRAC and RELPOL on the following two 
social dimensions of development – social protection and gender protection. In the 
social protection regression we make use of the following four control variables 
namely, government expenditure, government effectiveness, real per capita GDP (in 
natural logs), and human capital (secondary enrollment rates). In the gender protection 
regression we make use of the following four control variables namely, rule of law (to 
capture democracy), government effectiveness, real per capita GDP (in natural logs), 
and human capital (secondary enrollment rates). 
Again, the results in Table 3 suggest neither religious fractionalization nor religious 
polarization has a statistically significant effect on social development indicators in 
sub-Saharan Africa, whether both variables are estimated together (column 1) or 
independently of the other (columns 2 & 3). Column (4) which uses the traditional 
measure of religion finds one interesting result: there is a positive and statistically 
significant effect of catholicism on gender protection, as opposed to the negative but 
statistically insignificant effect of muslim adherence. 
Table 3. Religion and Social Development 
Social Protection  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RELFRAC -25.27   
(20.98) 
 -1.29 
(9.93) 
 
RELPOL 17.57 
(15.32 ) 
1.45 
(6.87) 
  
Catholics    .07 
(.06) 
Muslim    .02 
(.08) 
Protestants    -.14    
(.15) 
Obs 41 41 42 47 
Parms 6 6 6 7 
R-sq 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.74 
Gender Protection 
RELFRAC -35.91   
(26.26)     
-5.74    
(7.26)     
  
RELPOL 21.67    
(17.18)      
 -.05    
(.37)     
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Catholics    .13*    
(.07)      
Muslims    -.00    
.(06)     
Protestants    .01      
(.09)      
Obs 41 42 41 47 
Parms 6 6 6 7 
R-sq 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.65 
 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
correction. All regressions include a constant term.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Legend: * p=10%; ** p=5%; *** p=1% 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Our inquiry has been to investigate the effects of different dimensions of religion on a 
broad set of development outcomes. We regroup these outcomes into three broad 
categories, namely, development process outcomes (growth, investment, conflict, and 
government quality), institutional outcomes (property rights and the rule of law) and 
social development outcomes (social and gender protection). We utilized two new 
measures of religion – religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) and religious 
polarization (RELPOL), alongside the traditional measure (the share of population 
ascribing to a particular religion) as proxy for religion or religious diversity.  
 
Our results suggest that broadly speaking, religion or religious diversity has no 
statistically significant impact on the institutional and social aspects of development in 
SSA. However, our findings do suggest that religion has important effects on the 
development process through its effects on investment. In particular, our parameter 
estimates suggest that both religious polarization (RELPOL) and religious 
fractionalization (RELFRAC) have economically and statistically significant effects on 
investment in SSA, although their effects are opposite in nature: while religious 
fractionalization significantly reduces investment, religious polarization potentially 
increases investment. The observation of a positive association between religious 
polarization and investment can be interpreted along the lines of Adam Smith’s logic 
of religious competition driving the supply of religious goods, while the negative 
association of religious fractionalization with investment can be interpreted along the 
lines of Easterly & Levine’s (1997) logic of ethnic diversity reducing the supply of 
public goods in Africa. We also find a positive and statistically significant effect of 
catholicism on gender protection, while we do not find any statistically significant 
relationship between the muslim religion and gender protection, even though we 
observe an inverse relationship. Given the ambivalence of this finding in light of the 
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strong correlation between RELPOL and RELFRAC, an immediate line of further 
research is to try to unravel the exact nature of the relationship between these two 
variables and investment.  
In light of our fundamental research question, African policy-makers need to pay 
attention to the changing religious dynamics and increasing religious polarization of 
African societies.  
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